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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Defendants West Indies Transport, Inc., WIT Equipment 
Co., and W. James Oelsner appeal their convictions and 
sentences for visa fraud, environmental crimes, conspiracy, 
and racketeering. The district court had jurisdiction under 
48 U.S.C. S 16121 and 18 U.S.C. SS 3231 and 3241.2 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a) provides, in part: "The District Court of the 
Virgin 
Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District court of the United 
States 
. . . ." 
 
48 U.S.C. S 1612(c) provides, in part: "The District Court of the Virgin 
Islands shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of the Virgin 
Islands established by local law over those offenses against the criminal 
laws of the Virgin Islands, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, 
which are of the same or similar character or part of, or based on, the 
same act or transaction or two or more acts or transactions connected 
together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan, if such act or 
transaction or acts or transactions also constitutes or constitute an 
offense or offenses against one or more of the statutes over which the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction pursuant to 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section." 
 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 3231 provides, in part: "The district courts of the United 
States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the 
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States." 
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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291.3 We will affirm.4 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
West Indies Transport, Inc. and WIT Equipment Co. 
(collectively "West Indies Transport") operated several 
businesses in Krum Bay, St. Thomas, including a dry dock, 
ship repair facility, and barge towing company. West Indies 
Transport's chief operating officer was W. James Oelsner. 
In 1987, West Indies Transport obtained permits to use five 
barges as fixed docks for its other vessels. In 1989, 
Hurricane Hugo seriously damaged some of these barges, 
shifting them from their permitted positions. West Indies 
Transport did not attempt to repair, reposition, or salvage 
these barges after the storm. Instead, it used these barges 
as docks, repair facilities, and housing for employees in 
their new unauthorized locations. In the process, West 
Indies Transport attached the barges permanently to shore, 
constructed walkways and ramps between the barges for 
use by vehicles and employees, and wired them for 
electricity. 
 
To staff its facilities, West Indies Transport hired an 
overseas agent to recruit Filipino workers. The Filipino 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3241 provides: "The United States District Court for the 
Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have 
jurisdiction of offenses under the laws of the United States, not locally 
applicable, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of such courts, 
and jurisdiction, concurrently with the district courts of the United 
States, of offenses against the laws of the United States committed upon 
the high seas." 
 
3. 28 U.S.C. S 1291 provides, in part: "The courts of appeals (other than 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the 
United States, the United States District Court for the District of the 
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme 
Court." 
 
4. In some instances, it is difficult for us to ascertain the precise 
basis 
of the defendants' claims for relief. We have construed defendants' brief 
in the most plausible fashion. 
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workers were instructed to apply for D-1 visas intended for 
non-immigrant foreign maritime crewmen, not the H-2 
visas required by law. The "West Indies Transport crewmen" 
never put to sea. Instead, West Indies Transport housed 
them in a converted shipping container on a barge and 
used them as dock workers. The Filipino workers were paid 
approximately $400 per month for a 56-hour work week. 
By using underpaid illegal foreign employees, West Indies 
Transport was able to reduce significantly its expenses for 
wages and wage taxes. 
 
In the course of its repair operations, West Indies 
Transport discharged several different pollutants into the 
navigable waters of the United States. Witconcrete II, a 
ferro-concrete barge, was heavily damaged in Hurricane 
Hugo. The stern was partially severed from the remainder 
of the barge, attached only by metal reinforcing bars, 
known as rebar. West Indies Transport did not attempt to 
repair, break up, or salvage the damaged stern. Instead, it 
cut the rebar by which the stern was attached and dumped 
the stern into the bay. Later, when West Indies Transport 
decided to move the barge, it cut additional protruding 
pieces of rebar from the structure and dumped them in the 
water. West Indies Transport also sand-blasted the hull of 
a vessel moored in its facility, causing paint chips and sand 
to fall into Krum Bay near the main water intake for the St. 
Thomas desalinization plant. The toilet system on the 
Witrollon, the barge on which illegal Filipino workers were 
housed, discharged raw sewage directly into the bay. West 
Indies Transport also collected steel scrap from its repair 
operations and dumped it twelve miles out at sea under 
cover of darkness. West Indies Transport never obtained a 
permit for any of these pollution discharges. 
 
Defendants were charged in a twenty-one count 
indictment for visa fraud, environmental crimes, 
conspiracy, and racketeering. Five counts were dismissed 
on motion of the government. A jury found defendants 
guilty on the remaining sixteen counts. Defendants moved 
for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which the district 
court denied. This appeal followed. 
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II. Visa Fraud 
 
A. 
 
Defendants were convicted of aiding and abetting visa 
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2 and 18 U.S.C. S 1546.5 At 
trial, the district court instructed the jury that defendants' 
representations to U.S. immigration and State Department 
officials verifying that Filipino workers hired by West Indies 
Transport would be working as crewmen aboard foreign 
flagged vessels were material as a matter of law. These 
instructions were consistent with our decision in United 
States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 988 (1985), which held that when a defendant is tried 
for perjury the issue of materiality is decided by the court. 
 
Between verdict and sentencing, the United States 
Supreme Court held that on a perjury charge under 18 
U.S.C. S 1001, materiality must be submitted to the jury. 
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995). "The 
Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to have a 
jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of 
every element of the crime with which he is charged. The 
trial court's refusal to allow the jury to pass on the 
materiality of Gaudin's false statements infringed that 
right." Id. at 2320. 
 
The rule announced in Gaudin applies retroactively to 
this direct appeal. Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997) (Gaudin applies retroactively 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. 18 U.S.C. S 1546 provides, in part: "Whoever knowingly makes under 
oath, or . . . knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with 
respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other 
document 
required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, 
or knowingly presents any such application, affidavit, or other document 
containing such statement -- Shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2 provides: "(a) Whoever commits an offense against the 
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures 
its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes 
an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would 
be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal." 
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on direct review; citing Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314, 
328 (1987)). Defendants contend that Gaudin requires a 
new trial. 
 
Defendants submitted to the district court proposed jury 
instructions which took the issue of materiality away from 
the jury, but now object to those same instructions. For 
this reason, the government asks us to treat the district 
court's instructions as non-reviewable invited error, under 
United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 812 (1994) and Herman v. Hess Oil Virgin 
Islands Corp., 524 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975). We decline to 
do so. Where a defendant submits proposed jury 
instructions in reliance on current law, and on direct 
appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we will 
not apply the invited error doctrine. Instead, we will review 
for plain error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. See Johnson, 117 
S. Ct. at 1548-49 (reviewing Gaudin error under plain error 
standard where defendant, relying on current law later 
declared unconstitutional, insisted at trial that materiality 
was an issue for the court, not jury, to decide). Under Rule 
52, "before an appellate court can correct an error not 
raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and 
(3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are 
met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to 
notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the 
judicial proceedings." Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1549 (internal 
quotations and brackets omitted; citing United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). As the Supreme Court 
explained in Johnson, "in a case such as this -- where the 
law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to 
the law at the time of appeal -- it is enough that an error 
be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id. See 
also United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(question is not whether error was plain at time of trial, but 
whether it is plain based on current law at time of direct 
appeal). 
 
Failure to submit the issue of materiality to the jury was 
error. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2320; Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 
1549. That Gaudin involved perjury under 18 U.S.C. S 1001 
rather than 18 U.S.C. S 1546, the relevant statute here, is 
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not significant given the identical character of the 
materiality element in both perjury statutes. See Johnson, 
117 S. Ct. 1544 (1997) (applying Gaudin to case involving 
perjury under 18 U.S.C. S 1623); United States v. DiRico, 78 
F.3d 732 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying Gaudin to perjury under 
26 U.S.C. S 7206(1)). 
 
A "plain" error is an error which is "clear" or "obvious." 
Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1549; Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 
Failure to send the issue of materiality to the jury is, in 
light of Gaudin, obvious or clear and therefore "plain" error. 
Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 
To satisfy the "substantial rights" prong of the plain error 
test, defendants usually must show that the error was 
"prejudicial" -- "It must have affected the outcome of the 
district court proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; United 
States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 
514 U.S. 1074 (1994).6 Defendants bear this burden of 
proof. Id. Defendants here have not brought to our 
attention any facts suggesting that a jury might have 
reached a conclusion different from the district court on 
materiality. Defendants presented no evidence at trial that 
their statements were not material. More importantly, the 
government introduced substantial evidence proving the 
defendants' representations were material. Indeed, had 
immigration officials known the true facts behind the 
Filipino workers' applications for visas -- defendants' 
intention to employ as dock workers illegally underpaid 
foreign workers housed permanently on derelict barges -- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 6. In Olano, the Supreme Court suggested that there might be a "special 
category" of structural errors that can be corrected under Rule 52 
regardless of their effect on the outcome of the trial, 507 U.S. at 735, 
but 
did not state what types of cases might fall under this special category. 
In Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1544 (1997), the Supreme Court declined to 
address whether a Gaudin error falls within this category. Our ruling in 
Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, assumed but did not decide that this "special 
category," whatever its content, does not include cases where the district 
court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense. 
We agree with that assumption. But see United States v. David, 83 F.3d 
638 (4th Cir. 1996) (failure to send issue of materiality to jury falls 
within "special category" noted by Supreme Court in Olano; reversal 
required regardless of effect on outcome). 
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the visas never would have been granted. For these 
reasons, defendants have not met their burden of proving 
that the failure to submit the issue of materiality to the jury 
affected the outcome of the trial. See United States v. 
Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir.) (Gaudin error not 
reversible plain error; defendant failed to show that error 
affected outcome of trial), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 516 
(1996); United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(Gaudin error not reversible plain error; issue of materiality 
not seriously disputed at trial). 
 
"When the first three parts of Olano are satisfied, an 
appellate court must then determine whether the forfeited 
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings before it may exercise its 
discretion to correct the error." Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1550 
(internal quotations and brackets omitted). Whether or not 
their substantial rights were affected, defendants have not 
satisfied the fourth prong of the Olano test. In Johnson, a 
case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court observed 
that the evidence of materiality was "overwhelming," 
materiality was "essentially uncontroverted at trial," and 
the defendant had presented "no plausible argument" that 
her false statements were "somehow not material." Id. The 
Supreme Court concluded: "On this record there is no basis 
for concluding that the error seriously affected the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 
Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such as this 
which would have that effect. . . . No miscarriage of justice 
will result here if we do not notice the error, and we decline 
to do so." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 
In the same manner, the evidence at trial that West 
Indies Transport's representations were material was 
overwhelming and uncontroverted. On appeal, defendants 
have not presented a plausible argument that their 
statements were not material. The failure to submit 
materiality to the jury did not seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the convictions on visa 
fraud. 
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B. 
 
Defendants contend their convictions for aiding and 
abetting visa fraud must be reversed because the district 
court did not instruct the jury that it must find "knowing 
subscription" or "knowing presentation" of false material. 
Not only did defendants fail to request such an instruction, 
their proposed instruction was remarkably similar to that 
actually delivered by the district court.7  "Thus, if there was 
any error at all, it was `invited error' and cannot now be a 
basis for reversal." United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 
661 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Herman v. Hess Oil Virgin 
Islands Corp., 524 F.2d 767, 772 (3d Cir. 1975)), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 812 (1994). 
 
C. 
 
Defendants contend as a matter of law they could not be 
convicted of aiding and abetting visa fraud because the 
government conceded that immigrant workers who 
presented false information to the INS at West Indies 
Transport's instigation lacked criminal intent. We review de 
novo where the question is one of statutory interpretation. 
United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The aiding and abetting statute provides, inter alia, that 
a defendant is liable if he willfully causes an act to be done 
by another which would be illegal if he did it himself.18 
U.S.C. S 2(b). For this reason, whether the immigrant 
workers lacked criminal intent is irrelevant so long as West 
Indies Transport intentionally caused them to submit false 
information. As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit explained, "it is well established that S 2(b) was 
designed to impose criminal liability on one who causes an 
intermediary to commit a criminal act, even though the 
intermediary who performed the act has no criminal intent 
and hence is innocent of the substantive crime charged." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Compare defendants' proposed instruction, requiring the jury to find 
that "knowing false statement be made" to the government, SA 1140, 
with actual instruction used, which required the jury to find that false 
statements were "made" and that the defendants "knew" that they were 
false, A 981. 
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United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1099 (11th 
Cir.), reh'g denied, 716 F.2d 914 (1983). See also Springs v. 
First Nat. Bank of Cut Bank, 835 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1988) 
("A person who causes the commission of an offense is 
punishable as a principal even though the person who 
commits the wrongful act violates no criminal statute 
because of lack of criminal intent or capacity."). 
 
In United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974), a physician was convicted for 
presenting false Medicare claims to the United States. On 
appeal, the physician argued that his conviction must be 
overturned because he did not present the claims to the 
United States in person. Rather, he submitted the false 
claims to two insurance companies, which forwarded them 
to the United States government. We affirmed his 
conviction, observing that under "S 2(b) a person may be 
convicted of causing a false claim to be presented to the 
United States even though he uses an innocent 
intermediary (in this case the insurance carriers) to actually 
pass on the claims to the United States." Id. at 1323. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached the 
same conclusion in United States v. Causey, 835 F.2d 1289 
(9th Cir. 1987). In Causey, a tax protester was convicted for 
aiding and abetting tax evasion by helping personsfile false 
tax returns. On appeal, he argued the government failed to 
prove that the persons actually submitting the false returns 
possessed criminal intent. The court rejected this argument 
"because it is immaterial to Causey's conviction whether or 
not the taxpayers were shown to have intended tofile false 
tax returns." Id. at 1291. "Under section 2(b) . . . the 
government need not prove that someone other than the 
defendant was guilty of the substantive crime. A person 
who causes the commission of an offense is punishable as 
a principal even though the person who completes the 
wrongful act violates no criminal statute because of lack of 
intent or capacity . . . . Whether the taxpayers had guilty 
knowledge in submitting the claims becomes irrelevant 
under section 2(b)." Id. at 1291. 
 
West Indies Transport's arguments are indistinguishable 
from those rejected in Catena and Causey. When a 
defendant uses an innocent intermediary to present false 
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claims or make false statements to the government, the 
criminal intent of the intermediary is not an element of the 
offense. 18 U.S.C. S 2(b). For this reason, the district court's 
charge was not erroneous. 
 
III. Environmental Crimes 
 
A. 
 
Defendants were convicted of violating the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1251 et seq., by (1) severing a 250-ton 
concrete and rebar block from the stern of Witconcrete II, a 
ferrous concrete barge, and dumping it into Krum Bay, St. 
Thomas; (2) severing approximately one hundred pieces of 
rebar and attached concrete from the stern of Witconcrete II 
and dropping it into Krause Lagoon; and (3) conducting 
sandblasting operations on a floating barge that projected 
sand and paint chip residue into Krum Bay. The Clean 
Water Act generally prohibits discharging pollutants into 
the navigable waters of the United States without a permit. 
But it only regulates "discharges" of pollutants from a 
"point source." See 33 U.S.C. SS 1311(a) and 1362(12).8 
Defendants contend as a matter of law their conduct did 
not constitute discharge of a pollutant from a point source. 
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. 
United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Barges are "floating craft," expressly included within the 
definition of "point source." 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. 33 U.S.C. S 1311(a) provides: "Except as in compliance with this 
section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this 
title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 
 
33 U.S.C. S 1362(12) provides: "The term `discharge of a pollutant' and 
the term `discharge of pollutants' means (A) any addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any 
pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any 
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft." 
 
9. 33 U.S.C. S 1362(14) provides: "The term `point source' means any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited 
to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, 
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel 
or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. 
The term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return 
flows from irrigated agriculture." 
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 "Discharges" include "any addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters from any point source." Defendants 
concede that Krum Bay and Krause Lagoon are navigable 
waters of the United States. Rebar, concrete, sand and 
paint chips fall within the Clean Water Act's broad 
definition of "pollutant." 33 U.S.C. S 1362(6).10 Therefore, 
cutting off pieces of a ferro-concrete barge and dumping 
them in Krum Bay and Krause Lagoon, or conducting 
sandblasting on a floating craft and allowing the residue to 
fall into Krum Bay, constitutes making an addition of a 
pollutant to navigable waters of the United States from a 
point source. Defendants' conduct fell within the applicable 
statutory definitions. 
 
Appellants' reliance on United States v. Plaza Health 
Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 
1245 (1994), does not alter our conclusion. There, 
defendant removed containers loaded with blood vials from 
his office, transported them in his car, and carried them to 
the Hudson River, where he deposited them during low tide 
in a bulkhead separating his home from the river. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
refused to consider defendant a "point source." But Plaza 
offers no guidance here because it focused almost 
exclusively on the application of the Clean Water Act to 
human beings: 
 
       As the parties have presented the issue to us in their 
       briefs and at oral argument, the question is `whether a 
       human being can be a point source.' 
 
* * * 
 
        Human beings are not among the enumerated items 
       that may be a `point source' . . . . if every discharge 
       involving humans were to be considered a `discharge 
       from a point source.' the statute's lengthy definition of 
       `point source' would have been unnecessary. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. 33 U.S.C. S 1362(6) provides, in part: "The term `pollutant' means 
dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage 
sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive 
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt 
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." 
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* * * 
 
        The Clean Water Act generally targets industrial and 
       municipal sources of pollutants, as is evident from a 
       perusal of its many sections . . . . The legislative 
       history of the CWA . . . confirms the act's focus on 
       industrial polluters. 
 
* * * 
 
        We find no suggestion either in the act itself or in the 
       history of its passage that congress intended the CWA 
       to impose criminal liability on an individual for the 
       myriad, random acts of human waste disposal, for 
       example, a passerby who flings a candy wrapper into 
       the Hudson River, or a urinating swimmer. Discussions 
       during the passage of the 1972 amendments indicate 
       that congress had bigger fish to fry. 
 
Id. at 647 (citations omitted). Congress intended a broad 
definition of "point source:" "[t]he concept of a point source 
was designed to further this [regulatory] scheme by 
embracing the broadest possible definition of any 
identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter 
the waters of the United States." United States v. Earth 
Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979). Plaza 
properly circumscribed the breadth of the "point source" 
definition that the rebar was actually part of the Witconcrete 
II and does not alter the analysis. Before and after the 
severance of the rebar, the Witconcrete II qualified as a 
"vessel or other floating craft" within the parameters of 33 
U.S.C. S 1362(14). The deliberate amputation of a portion of 
the vessel did not destroy the Witconcrete II's suitablity as 
a "point source." Cf. Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. 
Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251, 257 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[i]t would seem unlikely that Building 15 
would fit into this interpretation of point source as any 
discharge of material would not be deliberate or 
systematic"). We see no error here. 
 
B. 
 
Defendants were also convicted for discharging untreated 
sewage into Krum Bay from a barge used to house their 
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workers, in violation of 33 U.S.C. SS 1311(a) and 
1319(c)(2)(A).11 Defendants correctly argue and the 
government concedes that "sewage from vessels" is 
regulated under 33 U.S.C. S 1322, not SS 1311 and 1319. 
Thus, if defendants' barge falls within the statutory 
definition of "vessel," the conduct in question does not 
violate S 1311(a) and S 1319(c)(2)(A) and their convictions 
must be reversed. Defendants maintain their barge on 
which they housed Filipino workers is a vessel. We 
disagree. 
 
33 U.S.C. S 1322(a)(1) defines "new vessel" and "existing 
vessel" to include "every description of watercraft or other 
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a 
means of transportation on water." This definition contrasts 
vessels with "other floating craft," a term which the Clean 
Water Act does not define, but which suggests by its terms 
and in the context of the statute an artificial water-borne 
contrivance that, in contrast to a vessel, is not used or 
capable of being used for transportation purposes. See 33 
U.S.C. S 1362(12). At all relevant times, the barge in 
question was moored permanently to shore. It was used to 
house foreign workers, not as a means of transport. Nor 
could the barge have been used for transport. According to 
testimony at trial, defendants' barge was half submerged in 
the water of Krum Bay, with part of the hull resting on the 
bottom and with water visible below decks. The barge could 
not be moved from its mooring. There was sufficient 
evidence therefore for the trier of fact to conclude that the 
barge was not a vessel within the meaning of the Clean 
Water Act. 
 
Though we are not aware of any authority interpreting 
the meaning of "vessel" under S 1322, our view is in accord 
with long-standing interpretation of the term "vessel" in 
other contexts. See Cope v. Valette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 
625 (1887) (dry dock attached to shore by large chains, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. 33 U.S.C. S 1311(a) provides: "Except as in compliance with this 
section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342 and 1344 of this 
title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 
Section 1319(c)(2)(A) provides for criminal sanctions for "any person" 
who "knowingly" violates S 1311. 
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with no means of propulsion, and incapable of being used 
for navigation, not a vessel; "The fact that it floats on the 
water does not make it a ship or vessel."); Kathriner v. 
UNISEA, Inc., 975 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[F]loating 
structures are not classified as vessels in navigation if they 
are incapable of independent movement over water, are 
permanently moored to land, have no transportation 
function of any kind, and have no ability to navigate."). 
 
C. 
 
33 U.S.C. S 1319(c)(2)(A) establishes criminal penalties for 
anyone who "knowingly" violates 33 U.S.C.S 1311. 
Defendants contend the district court erred when it failed 
to instruct jurors on the definition of "knowingly," arguing 
that jurors might have been unaware that an accidental 
discharge of pollutants was insufficient to convict. 
Defendants did not raise this objection at trial, so we review 
for plain error. 
 
Despite defendants' contention, the court instructed 
jurors on the meaning of the term "knowingly." It stated: 
"An act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and 
intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or 
other innocent reason. The purpose of adding the word 
`knowingly' is to insure that no one will be convicted for an 
act done because of mistake, accident, or other innocent 
reason." There was no error here. 
 
D. 
 
Defendants were convicted for violating the Rivers and 
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. S 403, which provides, in part: 
 
       it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building 
       of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, 
       bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in . . . any water of 
       the United States, outside established harbor lines, or 
       where no harbor lines have been established, except on 
       plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and 
       authorized by the Secretary of the Army. 
 
Defendants contend the district court should have 
dismissed this count because the government "did not 
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prove that the Defendants had knowingly built a pier, 
wharf, or any other structure." 
 
Under longstanding precedent, the prohibition on 
"build[ing] or commencing the building of any wharf, pier 
. . . or other structures" contained in S 403 contemplates 
"the purposeful creation of something formulated or 
designed, construction work in the conventional sense." 
United States v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1960). 
Thus, we have held that negligent creation of an 
obstruction to navigation does not violate S 403. See id. 
(negligently caused land slide resulting in blocked river 
channel not a violation of S 403). 
 
At trial, the government presented evidence that 
defendants intentionally strung together numerous derelict 
barges to form a permanent dock for loading activities, 
repairs, and the housing of employees. West Indies 
Transport permanently attached these barges together and 
to land with rope and wire cable. The barges and shore 
were connected by walkways defendants constructed out of 
metal and wood. The resulting wharfs were wired for 
electricity and were substantial enough to support 
significant loading and repair operations, including the use 
of forklifts. This evidence provided sufficient basis that 
defendants purposefully built an unauthorized structure. 
This was not a case where an act of nature or negligence 
resulted in an obstruction to navigation. It was clear that 
defendants here intentionally built a large dock to conduct 
their business activities.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's directive to 
interpret 33 U.S.C. S 403 broadly, courts have considered structures 
analogous to the barges at issue in the instant case"obstructions." See 
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 487 (1960) ("the 
Court . . . gave the concept `obstruction' . . . a broad sweep"), reh'g 
denied, 363 U.S. 858 (1960); Norfolk & W. Co. v. United States, 641 F.2d 
1201, 1210 (6th Cir. 1980) (" `obstruction' within the meaning . . . of 
the 
Act is to be liberally construed"). Examples of like structures which 
constitute "obstructions" include docks, piers, boat ramps, and sunken 
vessels. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Tugs "Cissi Reinauer" et al., 933 F. 
Supp. 1205, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding a houseboat, that served as 
a residence and was not moved for more than seven months, constituted 
a "permanently moored vessel" and an "unauthorized riparian 
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E. 
 
Defendants raise a second objection to their convictions 
under 33 U.S.C. S 403, the Rivers and Harbors Act. 33 
U.S.C. S 403 sanctions the construction of structures in 
water of the United States only when those structures are 
built "outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor 
lines have been established." 33 U.S.C. S 403. The district 
court did not instruct the jury that it must find defendants 
built a structure outside harbor lines, or where no lines 
have been established. Although defendants now contend 
on appeal the jury instruction was fatally deficient, their 
proposed jury instruction made no mention of the"harbor 
lines" element. "Thus, if there was any error at all, it was 
`invited error' and cannot now be a basis for reversal." 
United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 661 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Herman v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 524 F.2d 
767, 772 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
 
If not invited error, we would review for plain error 
because defendants did not object at trial. A plain error 
must be "prejudicial" -- "It must have affected the outcome 
of the district court proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; 
United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893 (3d Cir. 1994) (same). 
Defendants bear this burden of proof. Id. 
 
Defendants have not brought to our attention any 
evidence suggesting that the district court's instruction 
affected the outcome of the trial. West Indies Transport has 
not argued, at trial or on appeal, that its docks were in fact 
constructed within established harbor lines, or where no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
`obstruction' " for purposes of S 403) (citations omitted); United States 
v. 
Lambert, 915 F. Supp. 797, 804 (S.D.W. Va. 1996) ("[t]he dock and its 
extension are `structures' that obstruct the navigable capacity of the 
River. The River's normal flow and circulation patterns have been 
disrupted also"); Fox Bay Partners v. United States Corps of Engineers, 
831 F. Supp. 605, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("the construction of docks, piers, 
and boat ramps creates obstructions in the navigable waters of the 
United States"); United States v. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 
1023, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("[a] barge, whether negligently or 
intentionally sunk in a navigable river of the United States, to further 
the purpose of the Act and not narrow it . . . [is included] as an 
obstruction"). 
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lines have been established. On the contrary, defendants 
appear to concede this issue. Nor do defendants contend 
that a reasonable jury might have acquitted them on this 
charge had it been instructed on the harbor lines 
requirement. We see no indication that the district court's 
jury instruction had any impact on the outcome of the trial. 
For these reasons and because the district court followed 
the defendants' proposed instruction, the court's 
instruction did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Therefore we 
see no plain error. 
 
IV. Alleged Prejudicial Testimony 
 
Randolph Allen, a local labor official, testified for the 
government regarding the costs defendants would have 
incurred had they employed workers through legal means. 
Defendants objected to his testimony on the ground that it 
was unduly prejudicial and irrelevant. The district court 
allowed Allen's testimony as probative of defendants' motive 
and intent to commit visa fraud. 
 
After the conclusion of Allen's testimony defendants 
asked for a mistrial, citing possible prejudice among union 
workers on the jury against someone who employed alien 
labor. Defendants also asked the court to question the jury 
for possible prejudice. Denying the motion for mistrial, the 
court noted that defendants failed to raise this question 
with potential jurors during pre-trial voir dire. Nevertheless, 
the district court halted the trial and asked the jurors 
whether any of them had "such strong feelings for or 
against alien workers" that they would not be able "to 
decide this case fairly and impartially." No juror responded 
affirmatively. 
 
We review denial of mistrial for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 175 (3d Cir. 
1986). Allen's testimony was relevant to and probative on 
the intent element of the charged visa fraud counts because 
it tended to establish the defendants' motive. We see no 
sign of undue prejudice. Though the defendants did not 
raise this issue during voir dire, the district court carefully 
questioned the jury to ensure there was no prejudice that 
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might affect the jury's impartiality. We see no abuse of 
discretion here. 
 
V. Entrapment by Estoppel 
 
Defendants contend they were denied a fair trial when 
the district court prevented them from presenting evidence 
relevant to, and failed to instruct the jury on, two 
"entrapment by estoppel" defenses. 
 
A. 
 
The affirmative defense of entrapment by estoppel has its 
roots in two Supreme Court decisions, Raley v. State of 
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) and Cox v. State of Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 559 (1965), reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965), 
finding violations of due process. In Raley, defendants 
refused to answer questions of the Ohio Un-American 
Activities Commission after a state official erroneously 
informed them that they were protected under the state 
constitution's privilege against self-incrimination. The 
defendants were subsequently held in contempt. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state may not 
"convict[ ] a citizen for exercising a privilege which the state 
clearly had told him was available to him," for to do so 
"would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of 
entrapment." Id. at 438. The Court applied the doctrine 
again in Cox, where it reversed state law convictions for 
picketing because a state official had granted defendants 
permission to picket. 
 We have applied the entrapment by estoppel defense in 
only one prior decision, United States v. Pennsylvania 
Industrial Chemical Corp., 461 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1972), 
modified and remanded, 411 U.S. 655 (1973). In 
Pennsylvania Industrial, the defendant was charged with 
discharging pollution into the Monongahela River, in 
violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. S 407. At 
trial, the defendant sought to present evidence that its 
allegedly criminal acts had been authorized by Army 
regulations and the federal government's long-term 
interpretation of the statute. The district court prohibited 
the defendant from introducing the evidence and refused to 
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instruct a jury that the defendant should be acquitted 
if his actions resulted from affirmative government 
representations that its acts were lawful. 
 
Citing due process grounds, we reversed on appeal."The 
concept of fair play is implicit in our basic notions of what 
is meant by due process of law. In this regard, an 
individual or corporation should not be held criminally 
responsible for activities which could not reasonably have 
been anticipated to be illegal based on 70 years of 
consistent government interpretation and subsequent 
behavior." Id. at 479. Because the defendant had not been 
allowed to present the evidence nor had the jury been 
instructed on the entrapment by estoppel defense, we 
granted a new trial. Id. 
 
The Supreme Court agreed with our statement of the law, 
holding "it was error for the District Court to refuse to 
permit PICCO to present evidence in support of its claim 
that it had been affirmatively misled into believing that the 
discharges in question were not a violation of the statute." 
United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 
655, 775 (1973). The Court also held that the defense 
applied only where there is reliance in fact and that 
reliance was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. 
 
Since Pennsylvania Chemical was decided, other courts of 
appeals, citing the due process clause, have applied the 
entrapment by estoppel defense, although employing 
slightly different tests. See, e.g., United States v. Rector, 111 
F.3d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir. 1997) (entrapment by estoppel 
defense applies where "the one misleading the defendant be 
an official of the state; that he actively mislead the 
defendant; and that the defendant's reliance be actual 
and reasonable in light of the identity of the agent, the 
point of law represented, and the substance of the 
misrepresentation"; additionally, defendant's reliance must 
be in good faith); United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 
936, 938 (4th Cir. 1997) ("A criminal defendant may assert 
an entrapment-by-estoppel defense when the government 
affirmatively assures him that certain conduct is lawful, the 
defendant thereafter engages in the conduct in reasonable 
reliance on those assurances, and a criminal prosecution 
based upon the conduct ensues."); United States v. Trevino- 
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Martinez, 86 F.3d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1996) ("criminal 
defendant may be entitled to raise a defense of entrapment 
by estoppel only when a government official or agent 
actively assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal 
and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and 
continues or initiates the conduct") (internal quotations 
omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1109 (1997); United States 
v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The 
entrapment by estoppel defense applies when an authorized 
government official tells the defendant that certain conduct 
is legal and the defendant believes the official."); United 
States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir. 1991) 
("Entrapment by estoppel has been held to apply when an 
official assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, 
and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and 
continues or initiates the conduct."). These courts agree 
that reasonable reliance means a defendant must establish 
that "a person truly desirous of obeying the law would have 
accepted the information as true, and would not have been 
put on notice to make further inquiries." Trevino-Martinez, 
86 F.3d at 69; Brebner, 951 F.2d at 1024. 
 
We hold the entrapment by estoppel defense applies 
where the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the 
evidence that (1) a government official (2) told the defendant 
that certain criminal conduct was legal, (3) the defendant 
actually relied on the government official's statements, (4) 
and the defendant's reliance was in good faith and 
reasonable in light of the identity of the government official, 
the point of law represented, and the substance of the 
official's statement.13 
 
B. 
 
At trial, defendants sought to raise two entrapment by 
estoppel defenses. First, they wished to present testimony 
from certain West Indies Transport employees and INS 
agents. Defendants claimed the testimony would show that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The defendant's reliance is reasonable and in good faith only where 
a person truly desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the 
information as true, and would not have been put on notice to make 
further inquiries. 
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they had fully informed INS that they wanted to employ 
foreign nationals admitted to the United States on D-1 
crewman visas as dockworkers at their facility, and that 
INS had approved of the scheme. 
 
The district court held that "[t]o establish entitlement to 
the defense of entrapment by estoppel . . . defendants must 
show (1) that after fully informing government officials with 
actual or apparent authority of the underlying facts, they 
were advised that the alleged conduct was legal; (2) that 
they relied on that advice; and (3) that reliance was 
reasonable, and given that reliance, prosecution would be 
unfair." After holding an in camera hearing to review the 
proffered evidence, the district court concluded defendants' 
evidence demonstrated only that INS extended the Filipino 
workers' visas based on representations by West Indies 
Transport that the workers would soon be employed as 
crewmen on ocean-going vessels. The evidence also showed 
that defendants never informed any United States officials 
at any time that the workers would be living on United 
States soil and that they would work as dock workers on 
derelict barges and on land. For these reasons, the district 
court held that defendants had offered no evidence tending 
to prove that the INS was informed of and approved 
defendants' scheme to employ alien workers admitted to the 
United States on D-1 foreign crewman visas as permanent 
dockhands.14 
 
As the district court correctly observed, defendants 
pointed to no evidence tending to prove that the INS was 
informed of and approved defendants' scheme to employ 
alien workers admitted to the United States on D-1 foreign 
crewman visas as permanent dockhands. Defendants have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The district court said: "The proffered testimony has led me to 
conclude that no comments by a government agency can be construed 
as indicating to defendants that their conduct was legal, when no 
government official was ever informed as to the specifics of the given 
situation. Because defendants failed to inform any government authority 
of the facts which are relevant to obtaining the visas, they could not 
have obtained or relied upon any advice indicating that their conduct 
with regard to the information provided on the visa applications was 
legal. Thus the entrapment by estoppel defense is not available to the 
defendants in this case." 
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failed to establish a necessary element of the defense -- 
that government officials told them that their conduct was 
lawful. For that reason, the district court correctly excluded 
the proffered evidence. 
 
C. 
 
The second entrapment by estoppel claim arises out of 
defendants' convictions under the Ocean Dumping Act, 33 
U.S.C. SS 1411(a) and 1415(b)(1). Defendants were 
convicted for dumping large quantities of scrap metal and 
other debris into the ocean under cover of darkness, 
without a permit. Coast Guard regulations implementing 
the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C.S 1901- 
11, require all vessels 26 feet and longer to carry placards 
that warn vessel owners and crews that certain discharges 
of ship-generated garbage and sewage are prohibited at 
various distances from shore. At trial, defendants argued 
that the placards led them to believe that they could legally 
dump scrap metal into the ocean so long as the dump site 
was at least twelve miles offshore. The district court allowed 
them to present their evidence, but did not instruct the jury 
on the entrapment by estoppel defense.15  
 
Defendants contend their reasonable reliance on these 
signs absolved them of criminal responsibility under the 
doctrine of entrapment by estoppel. In the alternative, they 
contend the failure to instruct on the entrapment by 
estoppel defense violated their due process rights. 
 
Defendants have included in the appellate record 
examples of placards similar to those on which they 
claimed they relied when they believed their dumping 
operations were legal. One example, apparently produced 
by the Coast Guard, states that certain types of "non- 
plastic trash" may be discharged at sea if the vessel is at 
least twelve nautical miles from shore. The placard makes 
no representations about scrap metal. It also states, in 
clear type: "The information contained on this device is 
provided as a guidance to many, but not all, of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We cannot ascertain from the defendants' brief or appendix whether 
the defendants requested such an instruction. 
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discharge restrictions which apply under United States law. 
There are a number of discharge restrictions which are not 
set out in this device." 
 
Defendants were not entitled to an entrapment by 
estoppel instruction on the strength of this placard. The 
placard makes no representations about the legality of 
defendants' conduct -- dumping scrap metal off-shore. The 
placard expressly states that other discharge restrictions 
may apply, putting defendants on notice to make further 
inquiries to determine whether their conduct was legal. Nor 
would it have been reasonable for defendants to rely on this 
placard as an authorization to dump scrap metal off-shore. 
Large quantities of scrap metal generated by a ship repair 
facility do not fall within the plain meaning of"non-plastic 
trash." Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the 
defendants' claimed reliance was neither actual nor in good 
faith. Had West Indies Transport truly believed that its 
ocean dumping was legal, it would not have consistently 
dumped scrap metal under cover of darkness. 
 
The second example placard submitted by the defendants 
was manufactured by "Seachoice Products," apparently 
a private ship chandler. The entrapment by estoppel 
defense applies only to representations made by 
government officials, not to asserted reliance on legal advice 
or representations from non-governmental actors. 
Representations made by Seachoice Products or any other 
private entity as to the legality of ocean dumping cannot 
remotely establish a valid entrapment by estoppel defense. 
Even if the placard contained representations by the 
government, it would not warrant the defense, for the 
placard contains no statements regarding the legality of 
dumping scrap metal at sea. 
 
No government official ever told West Indies Transport its 
dumping operations were legal. Nor does it appear from the 
record that West Indies Transport ever asked the 
government for advice on this matter. Defendants were 
experienced operators in the maritime industry. It was 
clearly unreasonable for defendants to rely on a placard 
that appears on all types of vessels, including recreational 
boats, as legal justification for industrial ocean dumping. 
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VI. Racketeering and Conspiracy 
 
Defendants assert if we reverse their convictions on the 
immigration and environmental crimes counts, we must 
reverse their convictions for conspiracy and racketeering. 
Because we affirm defendants' convictions for visa fraud 
and environmental violations, we will affirm these 
convictions as well. 
 
Defendants also contend their racketeering convictions 
must be overturned because none of the predicate acts was 
a local Virgin Islands offense. The Virgin Islands RICO 
statute, 14 V.I.C. S 604, requires only that at least one 
predicate act charged as a federal offense also "constitute" 
a felony under Virgin Islands law. 14 V.I.C. S 604(j)(2)(C). 
But, the one requisite local predicate act need not be 
charged as a local felony, but merely "constitute" one. Here, 
defendants were charged with and convicted for conspiracy 
under federal law. Conspiracy also constitutes a felony 
under the Virgin Islands Code. See 14 V.I.C. S 551. We see 
no error here. 
 
VII. Sentencing 
 
Defendants raise several sentencing objections. 
 
A. 
 
First, defendants contend that the $500,000 fine imposed 
by the district court under the Corrupt Organizations Act, 
14 V.I.C. S 605, was excessive. We review the district 
court's determination of the amount of a fine for clear error. 
United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1284 (3d Cir. 1994). 
The defendants concede the fine falls within the range 
permitted by law. Nor have defendants pointed to any legal 
or factual error underlying the assessment of a fine in this 
amount. We see no error here. 
 
B. 
 
Defendants also contend the six level enhancement for 
ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge of a pollutant 
assessed by the district court under U.S.S.G. 
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S 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A) should be reduced because the raw human 
sewage defendants dumped into navigable waters was "fully 
biodegradable." Our review is plenary. United States v. 
James, 78 F.3d 851 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 128 
(1996). 
 
Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that 
untreated human sewage or fully biodegradable pollution 
warrants different treatment under the guidelines than 
other pollutants, nor any reasons why we should adopt 
such a rule. Because untreated human sewage falls within 
the clear meaning of "pollutant" under S 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A), we 
will affirm the enhancement. 
 C. 
 
The district court ordered defendants to pay restitution to 
offset the costs of cleaning up their environmental damage. 
Restitution is authorized only for violations of Title 18 and 
some Title 49 provisions. See 18 U.S.C. S 3663. Defendants 
contend the trial court erred by ordering restitution for title 
33 offenses. Our review is plenary. United States v. 
Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Defendants' argument is meritless. Each Title 33 offense 
also charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2. Restitution is 
authorized for violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2. 
 
D. 
 
Defendants also imply, though they do not clearly argue, 
that the amount of restitution was excessive given the 
amount of environmental damage caused by their criminal 
conduct. We review the appropriateness of a particular 
restitution award for abuse of discretion. United States v. 
Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1996). The district court 
calculated restitution based on Coast Guard estimates of 
the costs required to clean defendants' environmental 
damage. The district court also ordered that if the ultimate 
cost of the clean-up is lower than the Coast Guard 
estimate, any amount over the actual costs shall be 
returned to the defendants. This sensible approach appears 
appropriate and does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
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VIII. 
 
For these reasons, the judgments of conviction and 
sentence will be affirmed. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
I agree with most of the government's argument. 
Regarding the Clean Water Act charges, I cannot. It is true, 
of course, that "wrecked or discarded equipment" is a listed 
"pollutant" under 33 U.S.C. S 1362(6). Webster's, however, 
defines "equipment" as "the set of articles or physical 
resources serving to equip a person or thing . . . ." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 421 (1988). I do 
not think these parts of the Witconcrete II--which in better 
times were an integral part of its hull--can properly be 
thought of as part of the ship's equipment. They were not 
mere appurtenances, like a loading crane or radar antenna 
dumped over the side. I believe they were a part of the ship 
itself. 
 
That aside, however, there still was no "point source" 
within the meaning of the Act. The Clean Water Act 
prohibits discharging pollutants into the navigable waters 
of the United States without a permit; however, it regulates 
discharges only from "point sources." See 33 U.S.C. 
SS 1311(a), 1362(12). Appellants argue that they cannot be 
criminally culpable because as a matter of law the 
discharges above did not emanate from point sources. 
Under 33 U.S.C. S 1362(14), "point source" is defined as 
follows: 
 
       "any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, 
       including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, 
       tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling 
       stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel 
       or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or 
       may be discharged." 
 
Appellants rely on United States v. Plaza Health 
Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). There, the 
defendant owned a medical testing laboratory. He loaded 
vials of blood into his car and dumped them into the 
Hudson River. He was indicted under the Clean Water Act. 
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that defendant, as an 
individual dumping waste directly into a body of water, was 
not a "point source" within the meaning of the Act and 
reversed his conviction. 
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After first observing that "this statute was never designed 
to address the random, individual polluter," id. at 646, the 
Plaza Health Court looked to the language and structure of 
the Act and concluded that the listed items in the statute 
"evoke[d] images of physical structures and 
instrumentalities that systematically act as a means of 
conveying pollutants from an industrial source to navigable 
waterways." Id. It then reasoned that an interpretation of 
the statutory text that brought every act of "discharge 
involving humans" within the ambit of the term"point 
source" would make that text redundant, id.  at 646-47, and 
thus contrary to long-established principles of statutory 
construction. 
 
The Court next turned to the legislative history of the Act 
and found no congressional intent "to impose criminal 
liability on an individual for the myriad, random acts of 
human waste disposal, for example, a passerby whoflings 
a candy wrapper into the Hudson River, or a urinating 
swimmer." Id. at 647. Moreover, it found no such expansive 
interpretation of the Act in the criminal case law, although 
it noted that courts dealing with this issue in the context of 
civil penalties have construed the statute more broadly. Id. 
at 648. Finally, the Plaza Health Court found no evidence 
of any administrative interpretation by the EPA that would 
bring the defendant's conduct within the statute. Id. at 649. 
 
Based on these observations, the Court then concluded 
"that the term `point source' as applied to a human being 
is at best ambiguous." Id. Applying the rule of lenity, it held 
that the prosecution must be dismissed. Id. 
 
The government relies, however, on United States v. 
M.C.C., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985), in which a 
contractor building a bridge in the Florida Keys departed 
from the approved plan and brought construction 
assemblies in by barge. Unfortunately, the tug's screws 
stirred up sand from the bottom of a shallow body of water 
and redeposited it on nearby grass beds, damaging them. 
The M.C.C. court held that material already in the water, 
when redeposited, could constitute a discharge under the 
Clean Water Act. Id. at 1506. Without dwelling on the 
issue, the court concluded that because "vessel" was 
included in the statutory list of possible point sources, the 
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tug's screws were a point source under the facts of that 
case. Id. at 1505-06. 
 
It is evident to me that when Congress used the term 
"point source," it had in mind something other than the 
propulsion system of every ship that happens to operate in 
navigable waters. I would thus conclude that a point source 
is the conduit, conveyance or vector by which pollutants 
are discharged, and not the screws of a vessel stirring up 
old pollutants without discharging anything at all. 
 
I would not follow M.C.C. for another reason: there, the 
government sought only civil penalties. Here, we are 
reviewing a felony conviction, and must apply different 
maxims of statutory construction. Remedial statutes are 
typically construed broadly to effectuate the legislative 
purpose behind them. Criminal statutes are construed 
more narrowly to give defendants fair warning of the 
conduct the legislature intended to penalize. I conclude that 
Plaza Health fits our case particularly well, and would 
adopt its holding. 
 I would also conclude that the error here was plain. In 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770 
(1993), the Supreme Court clarified the standard that 
courts of appeals must employ when deciding whether a 
forfeited error warrants reversal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(b). First, of course, there must be an error that has not 
been knowingly and intentionally waived. Id. at 732-33, 113 
S. Ct. at 1777. Second, the error must be plain; that is, 
clear or obvious under current law. Id. at 734, 113 S. Ct. 
1777. Third, the plain error must have affected substantial 
rights, generally by affecting the outcome of the district 
court proceedings. Id. at 734, 113 S. Ct. at 1777-78. 
Finally, once this threshold has been crossed, the reviewing 
court must exercise its discretion, correcting the error if it 
"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings," Id. at 736, 113 S. Ct. at 
1779 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 
56 S. Ct. 391, 392 (1936)), as when the error caused the 
conviction of an "actually innocent defendant." Id. at 736, 
113 S. Ct. at 1779. 
 
Turning to this case, the Clean Water Act proscribes only 
"the discharge of any pollutant," 33 U.S.C.S 1311(a), which 
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in turn is defined as "any addition of any pollutant . . . 
from any point source . . . ." 33 U.S.C. S 1362(12). It is 
evident that the requirement that the discharge emanate 
from a point source is an essential element of the crime. 
 
We have held recently that "[t]he omission of an essential 
element of an offense from the jury instructions usually will 
be obvious error, and therefore ordinarily satisfies the first 
and second requirements of Olano." United States v. 
Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 920 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation 
omitted); accord United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 
774 (3d Cir. 1989) ("the failure to prove one of the essential 
elements of a crime is the type of fundamental error which 
may be noticed by an appellate court notwithstanding the 
defendant's failure to raise it in the district court"). Thus, I 
conclude that to the extent appellants' Clean Water Act 
convictions rested on the erroneous conclusion that the 
discharges came from point sources, the error was "plain."1 
 
I likewise have no difficulty concluding that the error 
involved appellants' substantial rights and seriously 
undermined the fairness, integrity and reputation of the 
judicial proceedings. If the discharges did not emanate from 
a point source, an issue to which I shall turn shortly, then 
appellants could not, as a matter of law, have been 
convicted of Clean Water Act violations, and are"actually 
innocent" of the offense. Such a conviction would be a 
classic miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, to the extent 
there was error, we have the power to correct it and I would 
exercise our discretion to do so. 
 
I believe that neither the discharge of the Witconcrete II's 
stern nor its protruding rebar qualifies as a point source 
within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. The severing of 
the stern was not a discharge from a vessel, as required by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. My conclusion is not altered by the fact that Plaza Health, a Second 
Circuit case, was not binding in this circuit at the time of appellants' 
trial. In United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1230 (3d Cir. 1996), we 
held that the defendant was entitled, on plain error review, to the 
benefit 
of a Supreme Court decision handed down after his trial but before his 
appeal became final. Here, the law was clear at the time of trial; 
although not binding in a formal sense, the holding of Plaza Health has 
not been questioned by any other court facing analogous facts. 
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33 U.S.C. S 1362(14). Rather, a part of the vessel itself was 
discharged. Appellants merely severed a wrecked, useless 
portion of the Witconcrete II to extricate a serviceable 
forward portion of it. This was a salvage operation, not a 
discharge of concrete and rebar through the 
instrumentality of the barge. 
 
Likewise, the severed rebar was not discharged through 
the "conveyance" of the barge, see 33 U.S.C. S 1362(14), it 
was part of the barge itself. Put another way, I think these 
two discharges are closer to the intermittent, manual blood 
dumping of Plaza Health than they are to the industrial 
paradigm of the sewage treatment plant, oil refinery or steel 
mill that animates most Clean Water Act cases.2 I would 
accordingly reverse appellants' convictions at counts one 
and two. 
 
I also disagree with the government's argument 
concerning the Rivers and Harbors Act. I rely again on the 
language of the statute, 33 U.S.C. S 403, under which it is 
prohibited "to build or commence the building of any wharf, 
pier . . . or other structures." In sum, these barges were 
placed in their current locations by the hurricane, not by 
WIT. At most, WIT wired them to the local utilities and built 
some walkways to connect them. That may be the "use" of 
an existing structure, but it is not the "build[ing]" of a new 
one. 
 
In more detail, appellants had a permit to moor four 
vessels in Krum Bay as docks. When Hurricane Hugo hit 
the Virgin Islands in 1989, it ran some of these vessels 
aground and otherwise shifted their positions from those 
specified in the permits. After the storm, appellants did not 
move these vessels back to their original positions, but 
used them where they sat. By November 1992, the permits 
had expired. In count three of the superseding indictment, 
the government charged appellants with misdemeanor 
violations of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. S 403, 
which proscribes creating piers and wharves without a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government also argues that the stern and rebar became "wrecked 
and discarded equipment," a listed pollutant under S 1362(6), but that 
begs the question of whether there was a point source, which I conclude 
there was not. 
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permit. Appellants did not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support their convictions in the district court, 
so again the plain error standard applies. 
 
Under longstanding precedent, prohibiting "build[ing] or 
commenc[ing] the building of any wharf, pier .. . or other 
structures" contained in section 403 contemplates "the 
purposeful creation of something formulated or designed, 
construction work in the conventional sense." United States 
v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1960) (emphasis 
added). There, we held that a negligently caused earth slide 
resulting in an obstruction to a river channel was not a 
violation of section 403. Likewise, we have held that 
negligently sinking a vessel in a river channel did not 
violate the Act. See United States v. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc., 
607 F.2d 624, 629 (3d Cir. 1979); accord United States v. 
Wilson, 235 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1956) (a sunken barge 
may be an "obstruction," but is not a "structure" in 
violation of S 403). 
 
Here, appellants had every right to moor vessels in Krum 
Bay, but the hurricane shifted them out of position. 
Appellants, however, never purposely put the vessels in 
their current positions and hence never built any structure 
in violation of the Act. Because, as I have discussed supra, 
the government utterly failed to adduce evidence supporting 
an essential element of the crime, I would deem the error 
plain and exercise our discretion to correct it under Fed. R. 
Crim. P 52(b). Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions 
at count three. 
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